Reply: This is verso good objection. However, the difference between first-order and higher-order relations is relevant here. Traditionally, similarity relations such as quantita and y are the same color have been represented, durante the way indicated mediante the objection, as higher-order relations involving identities between higher order objects (properties). Yet this treatment may not be inevitable. Durante Deutsch (1997), an attempt is made esatto treat similarity relations of the form ‘\(x\) and \(y\) are the same \(F\)’ (where \(F\) is adjectival) as primitive, first-order, purely logical relations (see also Williamson 1988). If successful, per first-order treatment of similarity would esibizione that the impression that identity is prior sicuro equivalence is merely verso misimpression — due preciso the assumption that the usual higher-order account of similarity relations is the only option.
Objection 6: If on day 3, \(c’ = s_2\), as the text asserts, then by NI, the same is true on day 2. But the text also asserts that on day 2, \(c = s_2\); yet \(c \ne c’\). This is incoherent.
Objection 7: The notion of incomplete identity is incoherent: “If per cat and one of its proper parts are one and the same cat, what is the mass of that one cat?” (Burke 1994)
Reply: Young Oscar and Old Oscar are the same dog, but it makes no sense preciso ask: “What is the mass of that one dog.” Given the possibility of change, identical objects may differ durante mass. On the relative identity account, that means that prezzo crossdresser heaven distinct logical objects that are the same \(F\) may differ sopra mass — and may differ with respect sicuro per host of other properties as well. Читать далее It does seem puro show, as the objector says, that identity is logically prior to ordinary similarity relations